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private	 sector	 non-financial	 corporations	 (PNFCs),	 which	 was	 exacerbated	 with	 the	 Great	 Recession.	
Many	 central	 banks	 aimed	 to	 revive	 bank	 lending	 with	 quantitative	 easing	 (QE)	 and	 unconventional	
monetary	policy.	 	 	We	propose	an	agent	based	computational	economics	(ACE)	model	which	combines	
the	main	factors	in	the	economic	environment	of	QE	and	Basel	regulatory	framework	to	analyse	why	UK	
banks	 do	 not	 prioritize	 lending	 to	 non-financial	 businesses.	 The	 lower	 bond	 yields	 caused	 by	 QE	
encourage	 big	 firms	 to	 substitute	 away	 from	 bank	 borrowing	 to	 bond	 issuance.	 In	 addition,	 the	 risk	
weight	 regime	of	Basel	 I/II	on	capital	 induces	banks	 to	 favour	mortgages	over	business	 loans	 to	 small	
and	 medium	 enterprises	 (SMEs).	 The	 combination	 of	 lower	 bond	 yields	 and	 Basel	 II/III	 capital	
requirements	on	banks,	which,	respectively,	impact	demand	and	supply	of	credit	in	the	UK,	plays	a	role	
in	 the	 drop	 of	 bank	 loans	 to	 businesses.	 	 The	 ACE	model	 aims	 to	 reinstate	 policy	 regimes	 that	 form	





















threat	 of	 a	 total	 collapse	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 system.	 The	 crisis	 had	major	 repercussions	 for	 the	 UK	
economy	that	witnessed	an	increase	in	unemployment	and	severe	contraction	in	GDP	BoE	by	about	4.7%	
in	 the	 last	 3	 quarters	 of	 2008.Like	 the	 monetary	 authorities	 of	 other	 countries,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	
(BoE)reduced	 its	 short-term	policy	 rate	 to	exceptionally	 low	 levels	 from	5.75%	 to	0.5%,	over	 the	period	
from	 July	2007	 to	March	2009.	However,	 lowering	 interest	 rates	proved	not	 to	be	 sufficient	 to	 support	
aggregate	 demand	 and	 help	 in	 the	 economic	 recovery	 to	 pre-crisis	 levels.	 Consequently,	 following	 the	
precedent	first	set	by	the	Bank	of	Japan	in	2001,	and	more	recently	by	the	US	Federal	Reserve	(Fed)	Large	
Scale	 Asset	 Purchase	 (LSAPs)	 programs	 of	November	 2008,	 the	 BoE	Monetary	 Policy	 Committee	 (MPC)	
launched	an	open-ended	asset	purchase	program	(APP)	in	March	2009.		Unlike	conventional	open	market	
operations	 involving	 short	 term	assets,	 central	banks	make	outright	purchases	of	 longer	 term	securities	
(see,	Haldane	et	al,	 2016)	under	 these	asset	purchase	programs,	also	 referred	 to	as	quantitative	easing	
(QE).	
As	the	APP	was	to	be	subsumed	under	the	1997	Monetary	Policy	Framework,	priority	was	given	to	
the	 necessity	 of	 “increasing	 nominal	 spending	 growth	 to	 a	 rate	 consistent	 with	meeting	 the	 inflation	
target	 in	the	medium	term”4.In	addition,	the	MPC	minutes	of	March	5	2009	note	that	APP	“would	also	













9/mpc0903.pdf). The	 assets	 purchases	 are	 also	 seen	 to	 be	 critical	 to	 the	 strategy	 “to	 ease	 the	 flow	 of	 corporate	 credit…	




































(a)	Amounts	Bank	Lending	(£Billion)		 	 (b)	Proportions	of	Total	Lending	 	
Source:	UK	ONS	Flow	of	Funds	Project:	Financial	Accounts	Excel	Sheet	3.2	




2008Q1,	 with	 the	 latter	 standing	 at	 £3.61	 Trillion,	 suffered	 falls	 in	 the	 4%-6%	 range	 in	 the	 period	
between	2008Q2-2009Q2.	 	Within	a	 year	 from	 the	 start	of	 the	APP,	 total	bank	 lending	 jumped	7%	 in	
2010Q1	 and	 the	 lending	 to	 households	 and	 private	 non-financial	 corporates	 (PNFCs)	 peaked	 at	 £1.74	
Trillion.	However,	over	 the	next	3	years,	 total	bank	 lending	 fell	by	1%-3%	annually.	 It	 showed	a	 fall	or	
little	to	no	growth	in	every	quarter	except	for	2013	Q1,	probably	because	of	funding	for	lending	scheme	
(FLS)	(Churm	et.	al	(	2013),	Badeley-Chappell	(2013)).		It	should	be	noted	that	when	bank	lending	to	rest	
of	 the	world	 (ROW)	 is	 accounted	 for,	 domestic	 lending	 fell	 by	 over	 £200	 billion.	 Further,	 lending	 has	
been	found	to	be	skewed	in	the	direction	of	mortgage	lending	to	households	with	its	share	of	total	bank	
lending	 rising	 from	 25.69%	 in	 2009Q1	 to	 38.18%	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2014.	 	 In	 contrast,	 non-financial	
businesses	(non-financial	corporations	and	SMEs)	faced	a	fall	in	bank	loans	with	their	share	of	total	bank	
lending	falling	from	15.91%	to	12.16%	over	the	same	period.	We	also	examine	the	extent	to	which	non-
financial	 firms	 substituted	 away	 from	 bank	 loans	 to	 bond	 issuance	 through	 the	 portfolio	 rebalancing	
channel.		
A	 number	 of	 studies	 investigate	 how	 QE	 policy	 influences	 the	 real	 economy	 through	 the	 portfolio	
rebalancing	and	other	channels.	Gagnon	et	al.	(2010)	emphasize	the	impact	of	the	Fed	LSAPs	programs	on	
the	 yields	 of	 the	 longer-term	 assets	 purchased	 under	 the	 programs.	 They	 point	 out	 that	 the	 programs	
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aggregate	 expenditure,	 asset	 prices	 and	 returns	 represent	 the	 path	 of	 transmission	 for	 the	 other	 four	
channels.	 By	 lowering	 asset	 yields,	 QE	 can	 boost	 aggregate	 spending	 through	 decreasing	 the	 cost	 of	
borrowing	 for	 firms	 and	 consumers,	 Joyce	 et.	 al.	 (2011).Joyce	 et.	 al.	 (2014)	 have	 also	 investigated	 the	
specific	mechanics	 of	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 by	 the	non-bank	 financial	 institutional	 investors	 such	 as	 Life	




help	 banksto	 remain	 buoyant.	 Hence,	 whatever	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	 the	 accumulation	 of	
‘excess’	 reserves	 at	 the	 central	 bank	 from	APP	 (see,	Reis,	 2016)6,	 and	 concerns	about	 such	extremely	
loose	monetary	 policy	 conditions	 for	 a	 prolonged	 period(see,	 Rajan	 (2010),	 Bean	 et.al.	 (2015))	 in	 the	
























excessive	 growth	 of	 the	 financial	 sector.	 Though	 related,	 the	 focus	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	 not	 on	 this	wider	
problem,	which	also	relates	to	banks’	chase	for	yield	and	carry	trades	associated	with	cross-border	bank	
lending	triggered	by	prolonged	low	interest	rates.		Instead,	this	paper	aims	to	reinstate	at	a	micro-level	the	










(2012))	 attribute	 the	decrease	 in	bank	 lending	 to	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 risk	perception	of	 the	banks.	 The	




prompting	 an	 individually	 rational	 but	 destabilizing	 and	 socially	 deleterious	 response	 to	 Basel	 capital	
requirements	 for	 which	 Jones	 claims	 econometric	 models	 may	 not	 be	 best	 suited	 to	 analyse.	 	 The	
perverse	 incentives	of	Basel	 II	has	been	implicated	for	the	 large	 increase	 in	 leverage	in	banks	with	the	
use	of	credit	default	swaps	(CDS)	in	addition	to	mortgage	securities	on	bank	balance	sheets		(Blundell-	
Wignall-Smith	and	Roullet	(2013)	and	Markose	et.	al.	(2012))	 	and	of	sovereign	debt	 	to	reduce	capital	
from	 the	 implied	 risk	weighting,	 respectively,	 in	 the	 carry	 trades	 associated	with	 the	 GFC	 and	 in	 the	
Eurozone	 crisis	 (	Acharya	and	Steffan	 (2014)).	 	 Following	 the	 Jones	 (2020)	precedent,	we	argue	
that	 an	 agent	 based	 model	 of	 bank	 lending	 is	 needed	 to	 show	 how	 the	 constraints	 and	
																																								 																				
8Stiglitz	(2011),	in	the	context	of	fixing	macroeconomics	in	the	post	GFC	era,	had	noted	that	certain	‘perverse’	incentive	structures	especially	in	



















of	 UK	 households	 is	 also	 modelled	 in	 detail.	 The	 distinction	 between	 big	 firms	 (BFs)	 and	 small	 and	










banks.	 The	 ACE	model	 of	 the	 paper	 follows	 the	 data	 driven	 approach	 described	 in	Markose	 (2013)	 in	
requiring	 that	 the	 distributional	 characteristics	 of	 the	 different	 economic	 sectors,	 such	 as	 households,	
nonfinancial	 businesses	 and	 banks,	 are	 based	 on	 empirical	 foundations.	 We	 implement	 an	 important		











institutional	 	 details	 and	data	 are	 included	 to	 investigate	 implications	of	 specific	macro-policy	 relevant	
measures	 that	 can	alter	behaviours	of	market	participants	 	by	using	 the	 simulation	model	 for	 scenario	
analysis	and	comparative	statics.	However,	while	the	BoE	ACE	focussed	on	the	buy	to	let	rental	market,	
we	 consider	 a	 wider	 loan	 portfolio	 decision	 model	 of	 UK	 banks.The	 important	 difference	 in	 banks’	
behaviour	with	the	 introduction	of	Basel	capital	constraints	 in	their	portfolio	allocation	decision,	comes	




for	 households	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 no	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	with	 the	 former	 only	 implying	 an	
overall	upper	limit	on	leverage	for	the	total	loan	book	without	distinction	between	the	asset	classes.		In	
contrast,	one	of	the	main	findings	is	that	what	was	a	less	than	rigid	preference	among	banks	in	favour	of	
mortgages	 and	 against	 loans	 to	 businesses,	 especially	 SMEs,	 has	 become	 a	 veritable	 mecca	 of	 what	
Schularick	et.	al	(2014)		have	called	‘mortgaging	up’	after	the	introduction	of	favourable	risk	weights	on	
mortgages	 in	 Basel	 II.	 Ofcourse,	 there	 has	 not	 been	 the	 aggressive	 capital	 arbitrage	 by	 banks	 either	
through	 remote	 or	 synthetic	 securitization	 (see,	 Blundell-Wignall-Smith	 and	 Poulet	 (2013))	 in	 the	 post	
2009	period	of	APP.	Our	results	are	consistent	with	the	empirical	findings	that	during	the	course	of	APP,	
the	assumption	that	banks	extended	mortgages	only	in	response	to	the	slack	caused	by	big	firms	reducing	
bank	 loans	 as	 bond	 yields	 fell,	 is	 a	 good	 one.	 	 However,	 the	 growth	 of	 UK	mortgage	 lending	was	 not	
sufficient	 to	 counter	 the	 decline	 in	 business	 loans	 ,	 therefore	 representing	 the	 main	 cause	 of	 the	
shrinkage	in	total	bank	lending.	It	is	envisaged	that	the	data	driven	agent	based	model	of	the	UK	banking	
sector	 will	 be	 extended	 in	 a	 modular	 fashion	 to	 encompass	 a	 more	 explicit	 characterization	 of	 the	
Brunnermeir	and	Sannikov	(2012)	stealth	recapitalization	of	banks	in	 low	interest	rate	regimes	and	also	
the	 search	 for	 yield	 carry	 trade	 financing	 by	 UK	 banks	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 	 Ideally,	 a	 fuller	
incorporation	is	needed	for	big	PNFC	behaviours	regarding	their	option	to	use	funds	from	bond	issuance	
to	buy	back	shares.		As	explained	in	the	literature	survey,	though	not	fully	exploited	yet,	ACE	models	can	
implement	 the	 endogenous/exogenous	 demarcation	 better	 than	 other	modelling	 techniques	 with	 the	
modeller	creating	exogenous	data	feeds	into	the	model	agents	in	a	time	specific	way.		
The	 reminder	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 surveys	 the	 relevant	 literature.	 The	




the	 simulation	 outcomes	 and	model	 validation	 results.	 Section	 5	 contains	 concluding	 remarks	 of	 the	
paper.	
	
2. The Related Literature 
This	 literature	 survey	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 subsections.	 The	 first	 gives	 a	 brief	 survey	 of	 the	 QE	
literature	 including	 that	 related	 to	 the	 Japanese	QE	 introduced	 in	 2001.	 The	 second	 section	 examines	
some	of	 the	main	papers	 in	 the	 field	of	 the	 impact	of	 capital	adequacy	 requirements	on	bank	 lending,	
especially,	in	recessions.	In	the	last	section,	the	literature	of	agent-based	computational	macroeconomics	
(ACME)	is	reviewed.	
2.1 The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Bank Lending 
Quantitative	easing	 (QE)	 has	been	 stimulating	 the	academic	 literature	 since	 its	 introduction	by	 the	
Bank	of	Japan	(BoJ)	in	2001,in	particular	post	GFC	when	the	monetary	authorities	of	the	US,	UK	and	EU	
started	to	pursue	unconventional	monetary	policies.	The	main	studies	on	QE	focused	on	the	influence	of	
the	massive	asset	purchases	on	asset	 yields	 and	 less	 so	on	 the	macroeconomic	 consequences	and	 the	
impact	 on	bank	 lending.	 First,	while	 authors	 agree	 that	 asset	 purchases	 under	QE	have	decreased	 the	
yields	of	government	bonds	(Kimura	and	Small	(2004)	for	Japan,	D’Amico	and	King	(2011)	for	the	US,	and	
Daines,	Joyce	and	Tong	(2012)	for	the	UK),	the	evidence	on	the	impact	on	other	assets	yields	has	been	
mixed.	 Kimura	 and	 Small	 (2004)	 point	 out	 that	 BoJ	 asset	 purchases	 led	 to	 lower	 premiums	on	higher	
grade	 corporate	 bonds.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 supported	 by	 McLaren	 et	 al	 (2014)	 who	 argue	 that	 asset	
purchases	under	APP	reduced	gilts	yield	and,	through	local	supply	effects	(asset	purchases	by	BoE	reduce	
the	supply	of	gilts	 remaining	 for	 the	private	sector),	 the	yields	of	corporate	bonds.	They	claim	that	 the	
expected	 asset	 purchases	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 yields	 after	 each	 announcement	 in	March	 2009,	
August	2009,	and	February	2012.	Similar	 results	 for	Fed’s	LSAP	programs	are	revealed	by	Gagnon	et	al.	
(2010).	They	show	that	the	programs	led	to	dropsof	30	to	100	basis	points	in	the	risk	premium	component	
(rather	than	expectation	component)	of	 the	 longer-term	yields.	Conversely,	Oda	and	Ueda	 (2005)	show	
that	 the	 BoJ	monetary	 policy	 at	 close	 to	 zero	 interest	 rate	was	 effective	 in	 lowering	 the	 expectations	
component	of	interest	rates.	However,	the	portfolio	rebalancing	effects	on	the	risk	premium	component	
were	 not	 significant.	 The	 papers	 that	 analyse	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 wider	 economy	 generally	 specify	 a	
positive	 influence	of	QE	on	 the	 real	 economy.	 For	 instance,	Honda,	 Kuroki,	 and	 Tachibana	 (2007)	 and	
Harada	and	Masujima	(2009)	indicate	that	BoJ	QE	increased	aggregate	output	through	asset	prices	and	
bank	reserves.	This	conclusion	is	supported	by	the	results	for	US	QE	(Chen,	Cúrdia,	and	Ferrero	(2011)	
and	Baumeister	and	Benati	 (2010))	and	UK	QE	 (Kapetanios	et	al.	 (2012)).	 Lastly,	 the	 response	of	bank	
9	
	
lending	 to	 QE	 program	 has	 received	 relatively	 lower	 attention.	 For	 example,	 Bowman	 et	 al	 (2011)	
identify	a	positive	but	 small	 impact	of	BoJ	QE	on	bank	 lending.	 Joyce	and	Spaltro	 (2014)	 show	similar	
outcomes	for	the	BoE	APP	program.	They	claim	that	the	effects	were	more	important	for	smaller	banks.	
2.2 Bank Lending and Capital Adequacy Requirements 
The	 influence	 of	 capital	 requirements	 on	 bank	 lending	 and	 bank	 behaviour	 has	 been	 investigated	
since	 the	 introduction	of	Basel	 rules	 in	 the	 late	1980s.	Thakor	 (1996)	 inspects	 the	 role	played	by	Basel	
capital	 rules	 in	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 US	 banking	 system	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 including	 the	 fall	 in	
aggregate	 bank	 lending	 and	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 share	 of	 government	 debt	 securities	 holding	 in	 the	
portfolios	 of	 US	 banks.	 He	 indicates	 that	 an	 expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 capital	
requirements	may	either	 increase	or	decrease	bank	 lending	depending	on	the	 impact	of	 the	 increasing	
money	 supply	 on	 the	 term	 structure	 of	 the	 interest	 rates.	 	 Hans	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 point	 out	 that	 weakly	
capitalized	 banks	 tend	 to	 substitute	 away	 from	 assets	 with	 higher	 risk	 weights	 and	 to	 cut	 their	 total	
lending	 to	 enhance	 their	 capital	 ratios.	 These	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 several	 authors11	 including	





of	credit,	some	studies	attribute	the	decreases	 in	bank	 lending	 in	recessions	to	demand	factors.	Berger	
and	Udell	(1994)	investigate	the	causes	of	the	reallocation	of	credit	by	U.S.	commercial	banks	from	loans	
to	securities	in	the	early	1990s.	Their	results	indicate	that	while	risk-related	credit	crunch	hypotheses	are	
not	salient	reasons	of	the	fall	 in	bank	 lending,	demand-side	 impact	on	 lending	tend	to	be	strong.	More	
recently,	 Bikker	 and	 Hu	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 credit	 rationing	 in	 a	 cyclical	 downturn	 is	 not	 driven	 by	 a	




switch	 to	 lower	 risk	 weighted	 assets	 is	 highlighted	 as	 an	 individually	 rational	 thing	 to	 reduce	 capital	
requirements,	 few	 papers	 take	 this	 forward	 as	 part	 of	 the	 macro-economic	 framework.	 Despite	 an	
influential	survey	of	Furfine	et.al	(1999)	that	asked	hard	questions	regarding	whether	the	Basel	regulatory	






include	 the	 incentives	and	constraints	posed	by	Basel	 rules	 for	 the	macroscopic	 implications	of	 this	 for		
the	wider	problem	that	banks	are	lending	less	and	less	to	non-financial	corporations,	especially	to	SMEs.	




the	 adoption	 of	 credit	 risk	 transfer	 by	 holding	 of	 CDS	 from	 AAA	 guarantors	 (like	 AIG),	 the	 observed	
extremely	high	levels	of	leverage	on	balance	sheets	of	US	FDIC	big	banks	could	not	have	been	achieved.		
Likewise,	 Acharya	 and	 Steffan	 (2013)	 gives	 the	 following	 analysis	 for	 the	 Eurozone	 crisis	 as	 a	 case	 of	
regulatory	capital	arbitrage	due	to	Basel	II	regulations,	which	assign	a	zero-risk	weight	for	investments	in	
sovereign	 debt.	They	 argue	 that	 governments	 themselves	 could	 have	 had	 incentives	 to	 preserve	 the	
zero-risk	weight	 in	order	 to	 increase	demand	 for	high	 risk	 sovereign	debt.	Acharya	and	Steffan	 (2013)	
state	 that	 “Undercapitalized	 banks,	 that	 is,	 banks	 with	 low	 Tier	 1	 capital	 ratios,	 have	 incentives	 to	
increase	short-term	return	on	equity	by	shifting	their	portfolios	into	the	highest-yielding	assets	with	the	
lowest	 risk	 weights	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 meet	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	 without	 having	 to	 issue	
economic	 capital	 (regulatory	 capital	 arbitrage)”.	 	 As	 will	 be	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 an	 ACE	
model	is	well	placed	to	test	out	perverse	incentives	that	lead	to	destabilizing	effects	of	policy.	
2.3 Agent-Based Computational (ACE)Macroeconomics 




inefficiencies	are	not	possible	 (Stiglitz	 (2011))	 and	 institutional	details	 and	 financial	 interconnections	 in	
the	 provision	 of	 liquidity,	 capital	 adequacy,	 	 solvency	 	 and	 contagion	 based	 negative	 externalities	 are	
ignored	 (Markose	 (2013)).	 Critics	 of	 the	 standard	 macro	 models	 have	 targeted	 the	 assumption	 of	
equilibrium	that	nets	out	all	private	credit	and	simply	cannot	 incorporate	herd	behaviour	and	network	















in	 the	 US	 and	 the	 Euro	 Area.	 For	 example,	 Teglio,	 Raberto	 and	 Cincotti	 (2013)	 use	 the	 EURACE	
environment	to	assess	the	impact	of	capital	adequacy	requirements	on	the	wider	economy.	They	perform	
simulations	over	a	40-year	period	and	examine	the	short,	medium	and	long	run	implications	of	different	
levels	 of	 capital	 adequacy	 ratios.	 Their	 results	 show	 a	 non-trivial	 impact	 of	 capital	 adequacy	 ratios	 on	





based	model	 for	 the	UK	mortgage	market	of	Battista	et.	al	 (2016).The	specificity	of	 institutional	details	
and	 policy	 conditions	 are	 finely	 modelled	 to	 analyze	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 relevant	 economic	 agents.		















3. Methodology of Data Driven Agent-based Model of UK Bank Lending 
3.1	Data	Characteristics	of	Agents		
We	model	the	developments	in	bank	lending	in	the	UK	after	the	introduction	of	APP	in	2009	using	an	






Our	 approach	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 five	 main	 steps.	 	 Firstly,	 our	 data	 driven	 ACE	 methodology	 	 is	
innovative		in	proposing	a	scale	factor	for	the	ABM	and	the	real	economy.		The	size	of	agent	classes	is	set	
in	a	way	that	replicates	the	actual	sizes	of	agent	populations	in	the	UK	based	on	data	from	the	ONS,	BoE	
financial	 statistics,	 Nationwide,	 and	 The	Money	 Charity	 around	 the	 launch	 of	 APP	 in	March	 2009.	We	






24	 respectively.	 	 As	 for	 banks,	 the	10	 largest	UK	banks	 that	 account	 for	 over	 87%	of	 bank	 lending	 are	
used.	 	Distributionally,	 the	 incomes	of	 the	10,000	HHs	 in	 the	ABM	are	set	 to	 represent	 the	UK	 income	
distribution	for	2009,	given	in	section	A.1	of	Appendix	A.		This	is	needed	for	the	purpose	of	modelling	HHs	
mortgage	 affordability	 used	by	banks	 as	 a	 lending	 criterion.	Additionally,	ONS	data	 indicates	 that	 cash	
holdings	of	households	represented	about	14.43%	of	their	total	assets	at	the	end	of	2008.15	
Second,	each	agent	is	given	a	balance	sheet	representing	its	initial	conditions.	The	value	assigned	to	
each	 item	 in	 an	 agent’s	 balance	 sheet	 is	 drawn	 from	 a	 distribution	 that	 replicates	 the	 empirical	
distribution.	For	example,	the	values	of	household	housing	wealth	are	set	to	reflect	the	fact	that	only	64%	










balance	 sheets	 of	 the	 10	 largest	UK	 banks	 in	 2009	 (see	Appendix	A.4)	 are	 used.	 In	 the	 third	 step,	 the	




role	 played	 by	 Basel	 capital	 adequacy	 rules.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 stage,	 the	 values	 of	 bank	 lending	
aggregates	to	households	and	nonfinancial	businesses	are	simulated	for	each	of	the	50	months.	Finally,	
the	 simulated	 bank	 lending	 aggregates	 are	 rescaled	 up	 and	 compared	 to	 the	 actual	 UK	 bank	 lending	
aggregates	for	purposes	of	model	validation.	
3.2 The ACE Model 
The	model	of	 this	 paper	outlined	 in	Figure	2	 has	 an	 the	endogenous	 segment	 (the	dashed	area	 in	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.)	which	is	embedded	within	the	wider	economy	where	the	relevant	
variables	relating	to	the	central	bank	,	 	 labour	market,	goods	and	services	market,	housing	market,	and	
capital	 markets	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 exogenous.	 	 The	 non-bank	 agents	 within	 the	 endogenous	 dashed	
segment	 are	 assigned	 to	banks	 and	 they	make	 their	 decisions	 specifically	 to	do	with	 their	 interactions	
with	banking	system	whilst	responding	to	the	exogenously	given	data	from	outside	the	dashed	segment	
in	Figure	2.	 	HHs	and	businesses	deposit	cash	 in	 their	assigned	banks.	HHs	and	businesses	also	seek	to	
obtain	 mortgages	 and	 bank	 loans,	 respectively,	 as	 conditions	 permit	 from	 their	 assigned	 banks.	 This	




Nonfinancial	 firms	 (BFs	 and	 SMEs)	 employ	 physical	 capital	 and	 cash	 to	 operate	 and	 finance	 their	
operations	using	a	mixture	of	debt	financing	and	equity.	The	amount	of	physical	capital	(and	total	assets)	
defines	the	firm’s	size	which,	 in	turn,	determines	its	accessibility	to	different	debt	markets.	While	SMEs	









2.	 According	 to	 Daines,	 Joyce	 and	 Tong	 (2012),	 the	 first	 round	 of	 BoE	 purchases	 caused	 a	 100	 basis	
points	 fall	 in	gilts	yields.	Hence,	 the	 impact	of	BoE’s	APP	 is	 introduced	 into	the	model	by	allowing	gilts	
rate	to	decrease	by	2.5	basis	points	each	period.	This	fall	in	gilts	yield	accompanied	by	the	low	policy	rate	
results	in	changes	in	the	relative	cost	of	corporate	bonds	and	consequently	has	significant	implications	for	
BFs.	 The	 reaction	 of	 banks	 to	 this	 fall	 in	 BFs’	 borrowing	 depends	 on	 the	 capital	 adequacy	 regime	 in	
operation.	Hence,	the	behaviour	of	banks	is	investigated	under	three	scenarios	that	reflect	three	possible	



















mortgage	 obligations	 (mortgage	 principal	 and	 interest)	 and	 to	 cover	 the	 deposit	 if	 a	 new	mortgage	 is	
obtained.	 	 	 Denoting	 housing	wealth	 of	 household	 i	 in	 period	 t	 as	𝐻𝐻𝐻#,%	 ,	 it	 can	 grow	 only	with	 the	
allocation	 of	 a	 new	mortgage,	𝑁𝑀#,%,	 to	 household	 i	 in	 period	 t	 with	 a	 5%	 loan	 to	 value	 ratio	 in	 the	
benchmark	simulation:	







in	 (3),	with	𝑃𝑃#,%	and	𝐼𝑃#,%,	 respectively	denoting	 	principal	and	 interest	parts	of	 the	mortgage	payment	
and	given	in	(4)	.	 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'( + 0.3	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,% − 0.050.95𝑁𝑀#,% − 𝑀𝑃#,%	 (3)	
	
	 𝑀𝑃#,% = 𝑃𝑃#,% + 𝐼𝑃#,%	 (4)	
	
Here,	mortgage	principal	repayments		and	interest	payments	are	calculated	as	in	(5)	and	(6).										
	 𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.95360 ×𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%×𝐻𝑃%'(	 (5)	
	







Note,	𝐻𝑃%:	house	price	 in	period	t;	𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%:	 the	number	of	mortgages	owed	by	household	 i	 in	period	t;	𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%:	the	mortgage	indebtedness	of	household	i	in	period	t;	𝑟<<,%:	interest	rate	on	mortgages	in	period	
t.	
						We	 denote	 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔#,%	 as	 the	 indicator	 for	 mortgage	 eligibility	 of	 household	 i	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 new	
mortgage	 in	period	 t	and	𝑀𝐴𝑣B # ,%	 is	an	 indicator	 for	new	mortgages	which	determines	whether	bank	
assigned	 to	 household	 i	 is	 willing	 to	 lend.	 The	 value	 of	 this	 indicator	 will	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 bank	
behaviour	 described	 later.	 These	minimum	 requirements	 employed	 by	 the	 banks	 are	 given	 in	 (7).	 	 To	
obtain	a	new	mortgage,	banks	require	the	applicant	HH	to	have	a	disposable	income,	𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'(,	that		is	at		
least	twice	the	down	payment	or	the	deposit	(5%	of	the	house	price		(0.05	×𝐻𝑃%)	and	have	no	more	than	
5	mortgages.	 	 Further,	 mortgage	 payment	 in	 the	 coming	month	 should	 be	 no	more	 than	 40%	 of	 HH	
income	,viz.	𝑀𝑃#,%D( 	≤ 0.4	×	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%	𝑖𝑛	 7 .	
	 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔#,% = 1 𝑖𝑓	𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'( ≥ 2×0.05	×𝐻𝑃%	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑀𝑃#,%D( 	≤ 0.4	×	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%'( < 50 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 	 (7)	
	
Thus,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 new	 mortgage,	 𝑁𝑀#,%	,	 is	 given	 in	 (8)	 as	 the	 house	 price	 less	 deposit	 if	 the	
conditions	in	(7)	are	met	under	the	proviso	that	the	bank	is	able	to	do	so.			





	 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%'( − 𝑃𝑃#,% + 𝑁𝑀#,%	 (9)	
	
	 𝐻𝐻𝐸#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐻#,%'( + 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,% − 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%	 (10)	
	
3.2.2 Big Firms (BFs) Behaviour  
As	 stated	 earlier,	 BoE’s	 APP	 decreases	 the	 cost	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 which	 triggers	 portfolio	
rebalancing.	 This	 induces	 BFs	 to	 replace	 part	 of	 their	 bank	 loans	 with	 corporate	 bonds.	 	 The	 model	
assumes	 that	BFs	keep	the	size	of	physical	capital	and	 total	debt	unchanged,	 issue	no	new	equity,	and	
maintain	 a	 constant	 annual	 operating	 profit	 (i.e.	 profit	 before	 interest)	 to	 total	 assets	 ratio	 of	 10%.	 In	
17	
	
each	 period,	 a	 BF	 chooses	 the	 debt	 financing	 mixture	 to	 maximize	 its	 net	 profit	 (𝜋#,%)	 which	 is	 the	
difference	between	its	operating	profit	(𝑂𝑃𝑃#,%)	and	the	cost	of	debt	financing:	
	 𝜋#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟X,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,% − 𝑟YZ,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%	 (11)	
	








data.	Equation	 (12)	 states	 that	 the	physical	 capital	of	 the	BF,	𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%	 ,	 remains	unchanged	 from	one	
period	to	the	next,	starting	with	the	initial	distribution	of		




	 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.10× 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'( 	 (13)	
	
The	 BF	 cash	 holdings,	 is	 net	 of	 the	 interest	 payments	 on	 its	 corporate	 bonds	 and	 bank	 loans:		
	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,%'( + 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟X,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%'( − 𝑟YZ % . 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%'(	 (14)	
	





and	 share	 repurchases	 will	 be	 modeled	 more	 explicitly.	 In	 view	 of	 the	 massive	 trend	 in	 the	 use	 of	 funds	 from	 bond	 issues	 for	 share	
repurchases,	our	model	could	overstate	the	switch	away	from	bank	loans	by	BFs.	An	explicit	BF	model	that	maximizes	earnings	per	share	
(EPS)	 or	 net	 profits	 divided	 by	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 outstanding	 indicates	 that	 the	 return	 on	 capital,	 ROE,	 can	 be	 increased	 either	 by	





is	 greater	 than	 interest	 on	 bank	 loans,	 rBF,t.	 	 If	 the	 opposite	 is	 the	 case,	 bank	 loans	 to	 BFs	 can	 be	
decreased	by	upto		1.45%	19as	follows:	
	
	 ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,% = 0 																				𝑖𝑓	𝑟X,% ≥ 𝑟YZ,%𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 −0.014598; 	0.009904 																				𝑖𝑓	𝑟X,% < 𝑟YZ,% 	 (15)	
	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,%	 (16)	




	 𝐵𝐹𝐸#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% + 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,% − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,% − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%	 (18)	
	
3.2.3 Bank Lending Behaviour  








requirements,	a	Basel	 I	 simple	 	 capital	 requirements	where	equity	 capital	 is	a	 fixed	proportion	of	 total	
lending,	and	 the	more	complex	case	where	equity	capital	 satisfies	a	 ratio	of	 risk	weighted	assets.	 	The	
main	behavioural	difference	that	the	introduction	of	Basel	rules	have	brought	about	is	an	addition	to	the		
banks’	 use	 of	 credit	 risk	 estimates	 on	 an	ad	 hominem	 basis	 in	 the	 pre	 Basel	 regime.	 This	 involves	 an	
institutionalized	implementation	of	a	Basel	complaint	cost	of	capital	measure.		In	summary	:	To	track	the	
impact	of	a	QE-generated	fall	in	demand	for	bank	loans	by	BFs,	banks	change	their	portfolio	of	loans	only	














agent	 of	 class	 i	 defaults)	 which	 increases	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 lending	 to	 class	 i	 agents.	 We	 assume	 for	
simplicity	 that	 the	 default	 risk	 costs	 are	 quadratic	 ,	 si,t(Li,t)=	 Li,t2.	As	 discussed	 earlier,	 banks	 proxy	 the	
default	risk	for	each	class	of	loans	in	terms	of	the	non-performing	loans	at	each	time	t	reported	as	write	




).	 Assuming	 that	 banks	 aim	 to	 keep	 the	 amount	 of	 total	 lending	 for	 these	 categories	 of	 loans	 fixed		
(𝐿bc% = 𝐿YZ,% + 𝐿<<,% + 𝐿Xde,%)	and	aims	to	reallocate	optimally	between	HHs	and	SMEs	what	remains	
after	the	wholly	demand	determined	BF	loan,	we	have:	20	
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		 	 	 	 	 	 (21)	
The	first	result	here	is	that	the	banks	operate	without	an	explicit	cost	of	capital,	and		even	if	there	are	
larger	default	costs	on	 loans	 to	SMEs	 in	 (20),	𝑠Xde,% > 𝑠<<,%,	 this	need	not	 imply	a	natural	bias	 toward	
mortgage	loans	as	rSME	could	be	greater	than	rHH.		However,	equations	(20)	and	(21)	indicate	that	a	fall	in	













HH t SME t
HH
BF t HH t SME t
L s









SME t HH t
SME
BF t HH t SME t
L s





( )*, , , 1 ,q-D = - + DHH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L L 	 (24)	
	
( )*, , , 1 ,q-D = - + DSME t SME t SME t SME BF tL L L L 	 (25)	
	
Equations	 (24)and	 (25)combines	 the	 optimal	 loan	 levels( * ,HH tL &
*
,SME tL )given	 in	 Equations	 (20)	 and	 (21)	
and	the	impact	of	changes	in	BF	demand	for	banks	loans	given	in	Equations	(22)	and	(23).			
3.2.3.2	Scenario	II:	Simple	Capital	Requirements	with	No	Risk	Weights	
To	 introduce	 the	 capital	 adequacy	 requirements,	 which	 state	 that	 at	 least	 a	 fraction	 γReq	 of	 bank	
assets	must	be	financed	by	equity,	into	the	model,	we	follow	Aliaga-Díaz,	Olivero,	and	Powell	(2011)	who	
state	that	if	a	bank	has	insufficient	capital,	it	is	subject	to	a	cost	that	increases	with	the	distance	between	
the	 required	capital	 to	asset	 ratio	and	 the	actual	one.	Hence,	 the	profit	 function	of	a	bank	 in	 this	case	
becomes:	
	 ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,1 1. . . .log .p d µ g g
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a d b= + 	as	they	apply	to	total	lending	.	Note	1/g	is	the	leverage	which	in	the	case	of	a	8%	capital	ratio	
is	 12.5.	 	 The	main	 change	 in	 the	banks’	 calculation	of	 the	profitability	of	 loans	 in	 the	 case	of	 a	 simple	
regulatory	capital	requirement	 is	the	direct	cost	of	equity,	d,	 in	(26)	and	also	the	penalty	for	deviations	
from	 the	 Basel	 approved	 leverage.	 The	 operational	 aspects	 of	 the	 binding	 capital	 constraints	 are	
governed	by	 the	μ	which	 is	 an	 indicator	 function	 in	 Equation	 (26)	 the	 values	 for	which	 are	 defined	 as	
follows:	








lending	in	any	period	t	( ,Tot tL )	which	maintains	the	10%	equity	to	total	lending	is	estimated:	
, 1 ,10 -= =åTot t t i tL E L ,	if	8%	<γt-1	<	10%		and	LTot,t#< ,Tot tL 	if	γt-1	<	8%.	 (28)	
	
Thus,	total	lending	has	to	be	reduced	from	 ,Tot tL 	if	γt-1	<	8%	and	we	will	denote	this	as	LTot,t
#.	
Accordingly,	the	profit	function	of	the	bank	can	be	rewritten	as	follows:	
	 ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,1 1. . . .log .p d µ g g
æ öæ ö
= - - - -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
å åB t i t i t i t i t i t Tot t
t req
r L s L L L 	 (29)	
	







and	(the		lower	bound)	of	the	total	amount	of	lending	being	given	by	 ,Tot tL in	(28).		
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( )**, , , 1 ,HH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L Lq-D = - + D 	 (35)	
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As	 in	Scenario	 II,	banks	attempt	 to	maintain	equity	 to	 risk	weighted	assets	 ratio	very	close	 to	10%.	
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> 0 	 (41)	
	
Thus,	unlike	Scenarios	I	and	II,	in	Scenario	III,	as	seen	in	equation	(41),	the	slack	in	total	bank	lending	


















*** . ΔLBF ,t( ) 																								 	 	 	 (42)	
The	first	term	is	negative,	and	the	second	term	is	also	negative	from	(41)	when	D 𝐿YZ,% < 	0, 	















firms.	 Additionally,	 the	model	 assumes	 that	 SMEs	 have	 unlimited	 demand	 for	 debt	 financing	 and	 that	
they	 cannot	 raise	 further	 external	 equity	 financing	 during	 the	 simulation	 period.	 As	 shown	 above	 in	
Scenario	 III,	 the	Basel	 II/III	 risk	weight	against	SMEs	 loans	 imply	 that	 they	cannot	enjoy	any	 increase	 in	
loans	especially	 in	the	period	of	APP	when	BFs	start	 to	replace	bank	 loans	with	bonds.	This	situation	 is	
more	 drastic	 when	 banks	 suffer	 capital	 inadequacy.	 Consequently,	 the	 components	 of	 a	 SME	 balance	
sheet	in	a	given	period	t	are	as	follows:	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'(	 (43)	
	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.05× 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'( + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,%'( 	 (44)	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,% = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,%'( + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟Xde,%. 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%	 (45)	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,% = ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%	 (46)	
	







































premium	on	BFs	bonds	(above	gilts	rate)	 is	set	at	2%	 initially	 to	make	the	 interest	rate	on	these	bonds	
higher	than	interest	rate	on	BFs	loans.		









At	 any	 given	month	 t,	 asset	 purchases	 under	 APP	 lead	 to	 an	 exogenous	 fall	 in	 gilts	 yield	which	 is	
reflected	 in	 the	 yield	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 through	 the	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 effect.	 BFs	 start	 to	 change	
their	debt	 financing	structure	when	the	cost	of	bonds	become	 lower	than	bank	 loans	cost.	Meanwhile,	
each	 household	 receives	 its	 income,	 finances	 its	 consumption,	 pay	 its	 mortgage	 instalment,	 and	
accumulates	 the	 rest	 into	 its	 cash	holdings.	 	 The	 first	 set	of	 results	 that	are	pertinent	are	 the	monthly	
rates	of	mortgage	approvals	under	the	3	bank	capital	regime	given	in	Figure	4.			These	hold	the	key	to	the	
systematic	bias	in	bank	lending	in	favour	of	mortgages	in	the	Basel	II/III	risk	weighted	regime.		While	all	3	




















































borrowing.	 The	 actual	 data	 in	Figure	 5	 shows	 how	 the	 total	 bank	 loans	 for	 the	 classes	 of	 loans	 under	
consideration	starts	at	about	£1.6	trillion	 in	2009	shows	a	relative	peak	 in	March	2010	at	£1.81	Trillion	
after	a	severe	crunch	and	then	trends	downwards	to	£1.75	Trillion	in	March	2013.		The	breakdown	shows	
that	 only	 mortgages	 grew	 from	 £0.81	 Trillion	 in	 2009	 to	 £0.95%	 in	 2013,	 while	 other	 loans	 types	 ,	
































note	 that	 while	 our	 result	 is	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 studies	 of	 	 Thakor	 (1996),	 Hans	 et	 al.	 (1999),	
andHeid,	 Porath	 and	 Stolz	 (2004)	 results,	 in	 that	 banks	 suffering	 from	 capital	 inadequacy	 will	 look	 to	
improve	their	capital	status	by	shifting	out	of	high	risk	weigthed	loans/assets,	the	ACE	model	here	builds	
a	more	detailed	conditions	of	APP	that	triggered	a	series	of	events	which	reduced	both	BF	loans	and	loans	
to	 SMEs.	 	 SMEs	 suffered	 disproportionately	 only	 due	 to	 their	 unfavourable	 Basel	 risk	 weights.	 As	 the	





































































































































around	 £0.1	 Trillion	 and	 in	 fact	 enjoys	 and	 increase	 to	 about	 £0.12	 Trillion	 in	 2013	March.	 	 Likewise,	
lending	to	BFs	increase	from	£0.42	Trillion	in	2009	to	£0.6	Trillion.			It	is	expected	that	Basel	I	unweighted	
8%	capital	implies	identical	leverage	of	10-12.5	for	all	asset	classes,	could	reduce	total	lending	compared	
with	scenario	3.	Hence	total	 lending	 in	2009	was	£1.3	Trillion	below	the	actual	data	of	 	£1.6	Trillion,	 in	
March	 2013,	 scenario	 2	 shows	 about	 the	 same	 level	 of	 total	 lending	 as	 lending	 as	 scenario	 3	 at	 £1.5	
Trillion.	But	what	 is	 interesting	 is	 that	with	a	 lack	of	bias,	 the	growth	 in	mortgage	 lending	 is	not	at	 the	
expense	of	loans	to	BFs	and	SMEs.			
		 Finally,	 the	 is	 a	 counterintuitive	 result	 regarding	 scenario	 1,Figure	 8,	 which	 shows	 the	 lowest	
amount	of	 total	 lending	at	about	£1.5	Trillion	 in	2009	 -	£1.2	Trillion	 in	2013	March.	 	The	 idea	 that	 the	
absence	of	an	explicit	regulatory	capital	rule	need	not	lead	to	excessive	lending	runs	contrary	to	the	what	
is	often	assumed.	Indeed,	as	long	as	the	banks	are	guided	by	the	optimal	rule	based	on	the	relative	credit	























4.3 Model Validation 
Several	validation	methods	have	been	used	to	validate	simulated	models	in	engineering	in	computer	




history-friendly	approach,	 a	good	model	 is	one	 that	can	generate	several	 stylized	 facts	observed	 in	 the	










Variable	 Coefficient	on	time	 Standard	Error	 p	value	 R2	
Simulated	BFs	Loans	 1.64	×	1010	 1.51	×	109	 0.00	 0.7059	















Simulated	SMEs	Loans	 4.87	×	109	 4.26	×	108	 0.00	 0.7269	
Actual	SMEs	Loans	 5.18	×	109	 4.71	×	108	 0.00	 0.7122	
Simulated	Mortgages	 2.93	×	1010	 2.17	×	109	 0.00	 0.7879	
Actual	Mortgages	 2.91	×	1010	 2.04	×	109	 0.00	 0.8063	
Simulated	Total	lending	 5.06	×	1010	 4.11	×	109	 0.00	 0.7557	







Actual	BFs	Loans	 1.100397	 0.125398	 0.00	 0.9937	
Actual	SMEs	Loans	 1.073266	 0.0112729	 0.00	 0.9946	
Actual	Mortgages	 0.9807749	 0.0074565	 0.00	 0.9972	
Actual	Total	lending	 1.03002	 0.0043908	 0.00	 0.9991	
The	 coefficients	 on	 the	 simulated	 variables	 and	 R2	 values	 in	 Figure10	 reveal	 very	 strong	 (almost	
perfect)	 correlations	 between	 the	 actual	 and	 simulated	 bank	 lending	 aggregates.	 Similarly,	 the	
comparison	between	the	results	of	the	regressions	of	each	of	the	actual	bank	lending	aggregates	with	the	








far	 from	 the	 case.	 In	 the	 context	 of	QE	 and	APP	 launched	by	UK	 authorities	 in	 2009,	 increasing	bank	
lending	 is	 one	of	 the	main	 goals.	 Yet,	ONS	 sectoral	 financial	 accounts	 data	 shows	 that	 although	bank	
lending	 to	 households	 for	mortgages	 has	 been	 expanding	 since	 2009,	 total	 bank	 lending	witnessed	 a	
noticeable	drop	driven	by	a	decrease	in	lending	to	businesses,	especially	to	SMEs.		We	explicitly	take	the	
reduced	 bond	 yields	 in	 the	 course	 of	 APP	 for	 triggering	 a	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 by	 big	 firms	 in	 the	





by	 the	 Basel	 capital	 adequacy	 rules	 on	 the	 UK	 banking	 system.	 	 The	 ACE	 model	 was	 developed	 to	
investigate	the	conditions	created	by	APP	and	QE	in	the	UK	primarily	on	bank	supply	side	responses	for	
lending	to	households	for	mortgages	and	to	SMEs,	which	unlike	big	firms	do	not	have	access	to	the	bond	
market.	 	 We	 have	 raised	 the	 important	 question	 whether	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	 should	
penalize	 sectors	 like	 SMEs	 when	 clearly	 the	 credit	 risk	 conditions	 do	 not	 warrant	 this.	 	 Indeed,	 the	
complex	Basel	 II/III	 risk	weighted	 framework	has	been	 implicated	 for	 causing	perverse	 incentives	 and	








macro-economic	 data.	 	 As	we	 saw	 this	 has	worked.	 	 Likewise,	 to	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 key	 bank	 lending	
decisions	 	we	recommend	how	ACE	models	should	embrace	the	embedding	of	an	endogenous	section	




Appendix A: Empirical Evidence on the UK Economy 	
The	UK	economy	data	around	the	launch	of	APP	in	2009	is	used	as	empirical	base	for	the	ACE	model.	
The	 Appendix	 includes	 relevant	 data	 that	 was	 used	 in	 the	 ACE	 model	 for	 the	 nonfinancial	 sectors	
(households	and	nonfinancial	businesses)	and	banks	in	the	UK.	
A.1  Households Income Distribution  
























































Number	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Only	64%	of	UK	households	own	at	least	
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